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Abstract
Belief and min-entropy leakage are two well-known approaches to quantify
information flow in security systems. Both concepts stand as alternatives to
the traditional approaches founded on Shannon entropy and mutual infor-
mation, which were shown to provide inadequate security guarantees. In this
paper we unify the two concepts in one model so as to cope with the frequent
(potentially inaccurate, misleading or outdated) attackers’ side information
about individuals on social networks, online forums, blogs and other forms
of online communication and information sharing. To this end we propose
a new metric based on min-entropy that takes into account the adversary’s
beliefs.
Keywords: Information hiding, quantitative information flow, belief
combination, probabilistic models, uncertainty, accuracy
1. Introduction
Protecting sensitive and confidential data is becoming increasingly impor-
tant in many fields of human activities, such as electronic communication,
auction, payment and voting. Many protocols for protecting confidential
information have been proposed in the literature. In recent years the frame-
works for reasoning, designing, and verifying these protocols have considered
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2The work of Vladimiro Sassone was partially supported by the project Horizon 2020:
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probabilistic aspects and techniques for two reasons. First, the data to be
protected often range in domains naturally subject to statistical consider-
ations. Second and more important, the protocols often use randomised
primitives to obfuscate the link between the information to be protected and
the observable outcomes. This is the case, e.g., of the DCNets [1], Crowds
[2], Onion Routing [3], and Freenet [4].
From the formal point of view, the degree of protection is the converse
of the leakage, i.e. the amount of information about the secrets that can be
deduced from the observables. Early approaches to information hiding in
literature were the so-called possibilistic approaches, in which the probabilis-
tic aspects were abstracted away and replaced by non-determinism. Some
examples of these approaches are those based on epistemic logic [5, 6], on
function views [7], and on process calculi [8, 9]. Subsequently, however, it
has been recognised that the possibilistic view is too coarse, in that it tends
to consider as equivalent randomized obfuscation methods that have very
di↵erent degrees of protection.
The probabilistic approaches became therefore increasingly more popu-
lar. At the beginning they were investigated mainly at their strongest form
of protection, namely to express the property that the observables reveal no
(quantitative) information about the secrets (strong anonymity, no interfer-
ence) [1, 6, 10]. Such strong property, however, is almost never achievable in
practice. Hence, weaker notions of protection started to be considered. We
mention in particular Rubin and Reiter’s concepts of possible innocence and
of probable innocence [2] and their variants explored in [11]. These are, how-
ever, still true-or-false properties. The need to express in a quantitative way
the degree of protection has then lead naturally to explore suitable notions
within the well-established fields of Information Theory and of Statistics.
Concepts from Information Theory [12] have proved quite useful in this
domain. In particular, the notion of noisy channel has been used to model
protocols for information-hiding, and the flow of information in programs.
The idea is that the input s 2 S of the channel represents the information
to be kept secret, and the output o 2 O represents the observable. The
noise of the channel is generated by the e↵orts of the protocol to hide the
link between the secrets and the observable, usually by means of randomised
mechanisms. Consequently, an input s may generate several di↵erent out-
puts o, according to a conditional probability distribution p(o | s). These
probabilities constitute the channel matrix C. Similarly, for each output
there may be several di↵erent corresponding inputs, according to the con-
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verse conditional probability p(s | o) which is linked to the above by the Bayes
law: p(s | o) = p(o | s) p(s)/p(o). The probability p(s) is the a priori prob-
ability of s, while p(s | o) is the a posteriori probability of s, after we know
that the output is o. These probability distributions determine the entropy
and the conditional entropy of the input, respectively. They represent the
uncertainty about the input, before and after observing the output. The
di↵erence between entropy and conditional entropy is called the mutual in-
formation and expresses how much information is carried by the channel, i.e.
how much uncertainty about the input we lose by observing the output (i.e.,
equivalently, how much information about the input we gain by observing
the output).
Even though several notions of entropy have been proposed in Information
Theory, Shannon’s is by far the most famous of them, due to its relation with
the channel’s rate, i.e., the speed by which information can be transmitted
accurately on a channel. Consequently, there have been various attempts to
define the degree of protection by using concepts based on Shannon entropy,
notably mutual information [13, 14, 15, 16] and the related notion of capacity,
which is the supremum of the mutual information over all possible input
distributions, and which therefore represents the worst case from the point
of view of security [17, 18, 19].
A refinement of the above approaches came from the ideas of integrating
the notions of extra knowledge and belief [20, 21, 22]. The idea is that the
gain obtained by looking at the output should be relative to the possible
initial knowledge or belief that an attacker may have about the secret. For
instance, assume that in a parliament composed by m Labourists and n Con-
servatives, m members voted against a proposal to eliminate the minimum
wage. Without any additional knowledge it is reasonable to believe that all
Labourists voted against. If however we came to know that exactly one Con-
servative voted against, then it is more reasonable to believe that the most
liberally-inclined Conservative voted against, and the least liberally-inclined
Labourist voted in favour. In this case, the a posteriori belief is likely to
be much more accurate than the a priori one, and the gain obtained using
the knowledge about MPs’ relative positioning on the left-to-right scale is
much larger than the one computed as di↵erence of entropies. Consequently,
[22] proposed to define the protection of a system in terms of the di↵erence
(expressed in terms of Kullback-Leibler divergence) between the accuracy of
the a posteriori belief and the accuracy of the a priori one.
Another criticism to the Shannon-entropy-based approach came from
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Smith, who argued that it is not very suitable to model information leakage
in the typical scenario of protocol attacks, where the adversary has only a
limited number of tries to guess the value of the secret [23]. In such a sce-
nario, the natural measure of the threat is the probability that the adversary
guesses the right value. The case of “one-try only” was dubbed by Smith vul-
nerability of the secret. Shannon entropy, on the other hand, represents the
expected number of attempts that an adversary has to make to discover the
secret, assuming that there is no limit to such number, and that the adver-
sary can narrow down the value by probing properties of the secret. Smith
gave an example of two programs whose Shannon’s mutual information is
about the same, yet the probability of making the right guess after having
observed the output is much higher in one program than in the other. In
a subsequent paper [24], Smith proposed to define the leakage in terms of a
notion of mutual information based on Re´nyi min-entropy (the logarithm of
the vulnerability), which captures the case of an adversary disposing of one
single try. Subsequent approaches going under the name of g-leakage have
extended the analysis to multiple tries, and to the case in which each guess is
associated with a gain (or loss) which depends on the level of approximation
[25, 26, 27]. The min-entropy approach remains however the canonical frame-
work, not only for its simplicity, but also because the worst-case min-leakage
(aka min-capacity) has been proved to be an upper bound to the g-leakage
[25].
In [28] the authors extended the vulnerability model of [24] in the context
of the Crowds protocol for anonymous message posting to encompass the
frequent situation where attackers have extra knowledge. They pointed out
that in Crowds the adversary indeed has extra information (viz., the target
servers) and assumed that she knows the correlation between that and the
secret (viz., the users’ preferences for servers). They proved that in such
scenarios anonymity is more di cult to achieve.
In our opinion, a fundamental issue remains wide open: the need to mea-
sure and account for the accuracy of the adversary’s extra knowledge. Indeed,
[28] assumes that the adversary’s extra information is accurate, and such an
assumption is generally not warranted. Inaccuracy can indeed arise, e.g.
from people giving deliberately wrong information, or simply from outdated
data. As already noticed in [22] there is no reason in general to assume that
the probability distributions the attacker uses are correct, and therefore they
must be treated as beliefs.
This paper fills this gap by generalising the model on Re´nyi min-entropy
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to cope with the presence of the attacker’s beliefs. To this end we propose
a new metric based on the concept of vulnerability that takes into account
the adversary’s beliefs. The idea is that the attacker does not know the
actual probability distributions (i.e., the a priori distribution of the protocol’s
hidden input and its correlation with the extra information), and is assuming
them. The belief-vulnerability is then the expected probability of guessing the
value of the hidden input in one try given the adversary’s belief. Informally,
the adversary chooses the value of the secret input which has the maximum
a posteriori probability according to her belief. Then the vulnerability of
the secret input is expressed in terms of the actual a posteriori probabilities
of the adversary’s possible choices. We show the strength of our definitions
both in terms of their theoretical properties and their utility by applying
them to various threat scenarios and comparing the results to the previous
approaches. Among its several advantages, our model allows to identify the
levels of accuracy for the adversary’s beliefs which are compatible with the
security of a given program or protocol.
This paper revises and expends an earlier version [29]. First, we have sim-
plified the model of the adversary’s belief. Indeed, in the previous model, an
attacker’s belief consists of a pair: an assumed prior distribution over the set
of secret inputs and an external channel leaking some (potentially incorrect)
information about these secret inputs to the adversary. In this exposition,
we simply model the belief by a subjective probability distribution, which
summarises the aggregated information about the secret initially collected
by the attacker from di↵erent and potentially conflicting sources of evidence.
This approach is more in line with existing models of beliefs in the literature
and simplifies significantly the exposition of our results and their comparison
to existing work. Our approach is motivated further in §Appendix A. The
flexibility of the model is illustrated in §6, where we apply our approach to
di↵erent programs under various attack scenarios. We show in particular
that a program which performs better than another in one threat scenario
might become worse when the threat scenario evolves. Finally, exploiting
notions and techniques from Dempster-Shafer Theory [30, 31], in §Appendix
B we propose a new technique to estimate the reliability of an adversary’s
belief. This allows us to obtain a sound method of updating an arbitrary
belief applying the Bayes’ rule for updating a hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in §2 we fix some basic
notations and recall some fundamental notions of Information Theory; in
§3 we briefly revise previous approaches to quantitative information follow;
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§4 and §5 deliver our core technical contribution by extending the model
on Re´nyi min entropy to the case of attacker’s beliefs and investigating its
theoretical properties; in §6 we apply our approach to various threat scenarios
and compare it to the previous approaches; in §7 we discuss the related work
whilst §8 contains our concluding remarks.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we briefly revise the elements of Information Theory which
underpin the work in this paper, and illustrate our conceptual framework.
2.1. Some notions of Information Theory
Being in a purely probabilistic setting gives us the ability to use tools
from information theory to reason about the uncertainty of a random vari-
able and the inaccuracy of assuming a distribution for a random variable. In
particular we are interested in the following notions: entropy, mutual infor-
mation, relative entropy and min-entropy. We refer the reader to [32, 12] for
more details.
We use capital letters X, Y to denote discrete random variables and the
corresponding small letters x, y and calligraphic letters X , Y for their values
and set of values respectively. We denote by p(x), p(y) the probability of x
and y respectively and by p(x, y) their joint probability.
Let X, Y be random variables. The (Shannon) entropy H(X) of X is
defined as
H(X) =  
X
x2X
p(x) log p(x). (1)
The entropy measures the uncertainty of a random variable. It takes its
maximum value log |X | when X is uniformly distributed and its minimum
value 0 when X is a constant. We take the logarithm with a base 2 and thus
measure entropy in bits. The conditional entropy
H(X|Y ) =  
X
y2Y
p(y)
X
x2X
p(x|y) log p(x|y) (2)
measures the amount of uncertainty of X when Y is known. It can be
shown that 0  H(X|Y )  H(X) with the leftmost equality holding when Y
completely determines the value of X and the rightmost one when Y reveals
no information about X, i.e., X and Y are independent random variables.
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Comparing H(X) and H(X|Y ) give us the notion of mutual information,
denoted I(X;Y ) and defined by
I(X;Y ) = H(X) H(X|Y ). (3)
It is non-negative, symmetric and bounded by H(X). In other words,
0  I(X;Y ) = I(Y ;X)  H(X).
The relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler distance between two probability
distribution p and q on the same set X , denoted D(p k q), is defined as
D(p k q) =
X
x2X
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
. (4)
It is non-negative (but not symmetric) and it is 0 if and only if p = q.
The relative entropy measures the inaccuracy or information divergence of
assuming that the distribution is q when the true distribution is p.
The guessing entropy G(X) is the expected number of tries required
to guess the value of X optimally. The optimal strategy is to guess the
values of X in decreasing order of probability. Thus if we assume that
X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} and xi’s are arranged in decreasing order of proba-
bilities, i.e., p(x1)   p(x2)   · · ·   q(xn), then
G(X) =
X
1in
ip(xi). (5)
The min-entropy H1(X) of a random variable is given by
H1(X) =   logmax
x2X
p(x) (6)
and measures the di culty for an attacker to correctly guess the value of X
in one try (obviously using the optimal strategy above). It can be shown that
H1(X)  H(X) with equality when X is uniformly distributed. In general,
H(X) can be arbitrary higher than H1(X), since it can be arbitrary high
even if X assumes a given value with probability close to 1.
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2.2. Framework
In this paper we consider a framework similar to the probabilistic ap-
proaches to anonymity and information flow used e.g. in [6, 33, 34], and [24].
We restrict ourselves to total protocols and programs with one high level
input A, a random variable over a finite set A, and one low level output
(observable) O, a random variable over a finite set O. We represent a proto-
col/program by the matrix of the conditional probabilities p(oj | ai) that the
low output is oj given that the high input is ai. An adversary or eavesdropper
can see the output of a protocol, but not its input, and she is interested in
deriving the value of the input from the observed output in one single try.
In this paper we shall assume that the high input is generated according
to an a priori probabilistic distribution p(ai) unknown to the adversary, and
we also denote by p (ai) the subjective probability modeling the adversary’s
initial belief, as explained in the introduction3. In other words, p (ai) is her
assumed a priori distribution of A.
Example 1. Let A be a random variable with an unknown (to the adver-
sary) a priori distribution over A = {0, 1, 2, 3}. Suppose that A is the high
input of the deterministic program C1 below, whose low output is
O =
⇢
1 if a 2 {0, 1}
2 otherwise.
PROG C1:
BEGIN
O := b log(A + 2) c
END
Now suppose that the adversary, for some reason, initially believes that A
is an odd number and that 1 is more likely than 3. For example p (1) = 0.9
and p (3) = 0.1. In the case of wrong belief, i.e., when A is actually an
even number, her low observation of PROG C1 does not allow her to realize
that her initial belief is wrong. She will not be able to correct it and will
therefore pick again the wrong value. Indeed, both observations 1 and 2
are compatible with the odd numbers. However, whereas observing O = 1
3See §Appendix A for the rationale for representing the adversary’s belief by a subjec-
tive probability distribution.
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p(o | a) o0 o1 o2
a0 1      0
a1 1 0 0
a2   0 1   
a3 1 0 0
Table 1: Conditional probabilistic matrix of PROG C2
would strengthen her belief that A is 1, seeing a low output of 2 might raise
some doubts if the adversary does not fully trust the source of her belief, as
the unlikely 3 (viz., p (3) = 0.1) has happened. In Section Appendix B we
present a novel technique allowing the adversary to estimate the reliability
of her initial belief and to discount it accordingly.
Now suppose that A is the high input of the probabilistic program C2
below, with low output O 2 { 1, 0, 2} and conditional probabilistic matrix
as in Table 1.
PROG C2:
BEGIN
R ‘sampled from {0, 2} with p(0) =   and p(2) = 1   ’;
If A = R
Then O := A
Else O :=  1
END
Contrary to the PROG C1, the low output of PROG C2 may allow the ad-
versary to realize that her initial belief about the parity of A is wrong. For
example if she initially believes that A is odd and then she observes that O
is either 0 or 2, then she knows that her belief is wrong. But the observa-
tion O =  1 does not help her to correct her inaccurate belief, as it can be
induced by both even and odd numbers.
3. Uncertainty vs accuracy
This section reviews the existing definitions for quantifying information
leakage. We begin by quantitative approaches to information flow based on
Shannon entropy and mutual information, and recall why they fail generally
to give good security guarantees. We then present alternative approaches
based on the adversary’s beliefs initially proposed by Clarkson, Myers and
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Schneider [22]. We conclude the section by presenting more recent alternative
approaches based on the concept of vulnerability [24] and Re´nyi min-entropy.
3.1. Shannon entropy approach
There seems to be a general consensus in the literature for using Shannon
entropy to measure uncertainty and mutual information to quantify informa-
tion leakage [35, 36, 14, 37, 33]. We remind the reader that these approaches
aim at quantifying information flow as a reduction of the adversary uncer-
tainty about the high input and take no account of the adversary’s initial
belief. Shannon entropy H(A) as a measure of the uncertainty of A seems
adequate to express the adversary’s initial uncertainty about A. Similarly, as
the conditional entropy H(A |O) measures the remaining amount of uncer-
tainty of A when O is known, it seems appropriate to express the adversary’s
remaining uncertainty. We thus have the following definitions.
• initial uncertainty (IU): H(A)
• remaining uncertainty (RU): H(A |O)
• information leakage (IL): IU  RU = H(A) H(A |O) = I(A;O)
Nevertheless, recent work by Smith [24] suggests that these notions do
not support security guarantees satisfactorily. In particular the remaining
uncertainty is generally of little value in characterising the real threat that
the adversary could guess the value of A given her low observations. Smith
uses the following example to prove that.
Example 2. Consider the following programs C3 and C4, where A is a uni-
formly distributed 8k-bit integer, k   2, & denotes bitwise ‘AND’, and
07k 11k+1 a binary constant.
PROG C3: PROG C4:
BEGIN BEGIN
If A mod 8 = 0 O := A & 07k 11k+1
Then O := A END
Else O := 1
END
PROG C3 reveals completely the high input when A is a multiple of 8 while
it reveals nothing about A otherwise (except of course the very fact that it is
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not a multiple of 8). On the contrary, PROG C4 reveals always and only the
last k + 1 bits of A.
According to Shannon entropy-based metrics, we have IU = 8k, RU =
7k   0.169 and IL = k + 0.169 for PROG C3, and IU = 8k, RU = 7k   1
and IL = k + 1 for PROG C4 (the reader is referred to [24] for the detailed
calculations). So, under such definitions, PROG C4 appears actually worse
than PROG C3, as 7k   1 < 7k   0.169, even though intuitively C3 leaves A
highly vulnerable to being guessed (e.g., when it is a multiple of 8) while C4
does not, at least for large k.
3.2. Belief approach
Clarkson et al. [21, 22] showed that the Shannon entropy approach is in-
adequate for measuring information flow when the adversary makes assump-
tions about the high-level secret and such assumptions might be incorrect.
Based on the conviction that it is unavoidable that the attacker makes such
(potentially inaccurate) assumptions, they proposed a new metric. They for-
malised the idea of an adversary’s belief as a distribution of A assumed by
the adversary: information flow is then expressed as an improvement in the
accuracy of such belief. The initial accuracy is the Kullback-Leibler distance
between the adversary’s initial belief and the actual value of A; similarly the
remaining accuracy is the Kullback-Leibler distance between the Bayesian-
updated belief of the adversary after her low observation, and the actual
value of A.
As already noticed by Smith [24], when the adversary’s belief coincides
with the a priori distribution of A, then the belief approach reduces again to
the inadequate standard approach illustrated above.
3.3. Vulnerability approach
Having observed that both the consensus and the belief approaches fail in
general to give good security guarantees, Smith [24] proposes a new metric
for quantitative information flow based on the notions of vulnerability and
min-entropy. We briefly revise these concepts here.
The vulnerability of a random variable A is the worse-case probability
that an adversary could guess the value of A correctly in one try. The
vulnerability of A, denoted V (A), is thus formally defined as follows.
Definition 1. V (A) = maxa2A p(a).
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The conditional vulnerability of a A given O measures the expected prob-
ability of guessing A in one try given O. It is denoted V (A |O) and defined
as follows.
Definition 2. V (A |O) =Po2O p(o)V (A | o), where V (A | o) is maxa2A p(a | o).
The initial uncertainty about A is then defined as the negative logarithm
of V (A), which turns out to be the min-entropy of the random variable A – cf.
(6) above. The remaining uncertainty about A after observing O is defined
as the min-entropy of A given O. Thus we have the following vulnerability-
based definitions:
• IU : H1(A) =   log V (A)
• RU : H1(A |O) =   log V (A |O)
• IL : IU  RU = H1(A) H1(A |O)
Security guarantees of the vulnerability-based approach: by applying
these definitions to the programs of Example 2, we have IU = 8k, RU =
8k   3 and IL = 3 for PROG C3, and IU = 8k, RU = 7k   1 and IL = k + 1
for PROG C4. While these quantities remain the same as in the consensus
approach for PROG C4, the new metric increases the leakage ascribed to PROG
C3 reflecting the fact that the low observations of PROG C3 leave the high
input very vulnerable to being guessed.
4. Unifying Belief and Vulnerability
We now propose an alternative approach based on the vulnerability con-
cept that takes into account the adversary’s belief.
4.1. Belief-vulnerability
Let A be a random high level variable. The belief-vulnerability of A is the
expected probability of guessing A in one try given the adversary’s belief.
The adversary will choose a value having the maximal probability according
to her belief, that is a value a0 2  , where   = argmaxa2A p (a). The
vulnerability of A is then the real probability that the adversary’s choice is
correct, that is the probability p(a0). As there might be many values of A in
  with the maximal probability, the attacker will pick uniformly at random
one of them. Hence we have the following definition.
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Definition 3. Let A be a random variable and   = argmaxa2A p (a). The
belief-vulnerability of A, denoted V (A), is defined as
V (A) =
1
| |
X
a02 
p(a0). (7)
The initial threat is the belief-uncertainty of A (viz. the belief min-
entropy4 of A) given by the following definition.
Definition 4. Let A be a random variable. The initial threat to A, denoted
H 1(A), is defined as
H 1(A) = log
⇣ 1
V (A)
⌘
. (8)
Note that from the above definition, the initial uncertainty may be infinite
when for all a in  , p(a) = 0, modelling the impossibility of a correct guess
in one single try when the attacker is choosing a value having zero prior
probability. However it might be very di cult to quantify the decrease in
uncertainty when initially it is infinite. Therefore we will assume throughout
the rest of this paper that initially every value is possible, that is p(x) > 0
for all x in X .
Example 3. Suppose that A is distributed over {0, 1, 2, 3} and the adver-
sary’s belief is about the parity of A.
Table 2 summarizes the initial uncertainty about A when the actual a
priori distribution and the adversary’s prebelief are p1 and p2, and p 1 and
p 2 respectively. The pair (p, p ) means that the actual a priori distribution
of A is p while the adversary prebelief is p . Thus in (p1, p 1) the adversary
believes that p1 always uniformly produces an even number while, though
it usually produces e↵ectively an even number, with probability 0.02 it also
produces an odd number that fools the attacker. However in a one-time
guessing attack, this slightly “inaccurate” belief does not a↵ect the vulnera-
bility of A as knowing p1, the actual a priori distribution, would not change
the attacker choice. In (p2, p 1), on the contrary, p2 usually fools the attacker
by producing an odd number while the attacker is always expecting an even
4We call it belief min-entropy since when the belief coincides with the actual a priori
distribution, then the belief min-entropy reduces to min-entropy.
13
(p1, p 1) (p1, p 2) (p2, p 1) (p2, p 2)
V (A) 0.49 0.01 0.02 0.47
H 1(A) 1.03 6.64 5.64 1.09
p⇢1 p1 p2 p 1 p 2
a0 0.49 0.03 0.5 0
a1 0.01 0.47 0 0.95
a2 0.49 0.01 0.5 0
a3 0.01 0.49 0 0.05
Table 2: Initial uncertainty in presence of belief
number. This decreases very much the vulnerability of A as it is almost im-
possible for the attacker to guess the value of the secret in one try when her
initial belief is so wrong. Hence, the increase in her initial uncertainty.
Next we show that the lower bound of the belief-uncertainty is obtained
with a full knowledge of the actual a priori distribution (viz., a true and
justifiable belief).
Theorem 1. H1(A)  H 1(A).
Proof. Let   = argmaxa2A p (a) be the set of the adversary’s possible
choices.
V (A) =
1
| |
X
a2 
p(a)  1| |
X
a2 
max
a02A
p(a0) ( since   ✓ A)
Therefore, V (A)  1| |
P
a2  V (A) =
1
| | | |V (A) = V (A). Hence H 1(A)  
H1(A).
The lower bound is reached if and only if all the adversary’s possible
choices have the actual maximum a priori probability.
Proposition 1. H 1(A) = H1(A) i↵   ✓ argmaxa2A p(a).
Proof. The proof in the right direction is similar to the proof of Theorem 1
where the inequality is replaced by the equality. To see why the opposite
holds, it is su cient to observe that when there exists an element of   that
has not the maximum a priori probability then V (A) is less than V (A).
Hence the uncertainty is greater than the lower-bound.
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In particular when the prebelief coincides with the actual a priori distri-
bution so are the belief min-entropy and the min-entropy.
Corollary 1. If p(a) = p (a) for all a in A, then H 1(A) = H1(A).
In the vulnerability model where the adversary is supposed to know the a
priori probability distribution of the high input, the minimum vulnerability,
or equivalently the maximum uncertainty, is obtained using a uniform distri-
bution. However in the presence of belief, the uncertainty can be arbitrary
high. In fact we have the following upper-bound of the belief min-entropy.
Theorem 2. H 1(A)    log
⇣
mina2A p(a)
⌘
.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1 with max replaced by min and the
inequality is reversed.
In particular the belief uncertainty hits the upper-bound when all the
adversary’s possible choices have the actual minimal prior probability.
Proposition 2. H 1(A) =   log
⇣
mina2A p(a)
⌘
i↵   ✓ argmina2A p(a).
The proof in the right direction is again similar to the proof of Theorem 1
where the inequality is replaced by the equality and max by min. To see why
the other implication holds, it is su cient to observe that when there exists
an element of   that has not the minimum a priori probability then V (A)
is greater than mina2A p(a). Hence the uncertainty is less than the upper-
bound.
We conclude this section by showing two interesting properties of the
belief uncertainty. First, we show that beliefs have no e↵ect on the initial
uncertainty of A when its actual a priori probability distribution is uniform.
In that case, any choice of the attacker results in the same actual vulnerability
and she has the same probability 1|A| of a correct guess.
Proposition 3. If A is uniformly distributed then for all initial belief p , we
have
H 1(A) = H1(A) = log
⇣
|A|
⌘
.
Proof. Let   = argmaxa2A p (a).
V (A) =
1
| |
X
a2 
p(a) =
1
| |
X
a2 
1
|A| =
1
| |
X
a2 
V (A) =
1
| | | |V (A) = V (A).
Hence H 1(A) = H1(A) = log
⇣
|A|
⌘
.
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Conversely, for a vacuous belief, the initial belief-uncertainty is indepen-
dent of the actual a priori distribution of the high input.
Proposition 4. If the prebelief is vacuous then
H 1(A) = log
⇣
|A|
⌘
.
Proof. If the prebelief is vacuous then its pignistic transformation p  (Lemma
4) is the uniform probability distribution. Thus   = argmaxa2A p (a) = A.
Therefore,
V (A) =
1
| |
X
a2 
p(a) =
1
|A|
X
a2A
p(a) =
1
|A|
X
a2A
1 =
1
|A|
Hence H 1(A) = log
⇣
|A|
⌘
.
4.2. A posteriori belief-vulnerability
The belief-vulnerability of A given the evidence O is the expected proba-
bility of guessing A in one try given the evidence. Given evidence O = o, the
adversary will choose a value having the maximal conditional probability ac-
cording to her belief, that is a value a0 2  o, where  o = argmaxa2A p (a | o).
But unlike the a priori belief-vulnerability, here the evidence O could contra-
dict the attacker prebelief. For example assume that the adversary initially
believes that the high input value is a2, that is p (a2) = 1 then she observes
the output o1 of PROG C5 of which we only give the channel matrix Table 3.
The evidence o1 contradict her prebelief since only a0 or a3 could produce
o1. Hence her prebelief becomes vacuous and cannot be used as an a priori
probability to update her belief.
p(o | a) o0 o1 o2
a0 0.99 0.01 0
a1 1 0 0
a2 0.01 0 0.99
a3 0 1 0
Table 3: Channel matrix of PROG C5
To avoid such completely wrong belief, we take the point of view that the
adversary initial beliefs satisfy an admissibility restriction (see e.g. [22, 38]).
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In particular, we consider an admissibility restriction we deem ✏-admissible
beliefs5, where a belief never di↵ers by more that a factor of ✏ from a uniform
distribution, that is, p (a)   ✏|A| for all a in A. Note that the evidence o
and the adversary prebelief could still be highly conflicting but never fully
contradicting each other. Indeed, consider again the program PROG C5 above.
If we assume that the adversary prebelief is such that p (a0) = 0.90 and
p (a3) = 0.01 then her belief highly supports a0. Now observing o1 would
conflict with this belief as the evidence o1 alone highly supports a3 rather
than a0: a0 would more likely have produced o0. In this section, we shall
assume that the adversary updates her belief using the Bayes’ rule. Thus,
the a posteriori belief is
p (a | o) = p(o | a)p (a)
p (o)
=
p(o | a)p (a)P
a02A p(o | a0)p (a0)
which is well defined thanks to the admissibility requirement. Appendix Ap-
pendix B introduces an advanced technique that takes into account the level
of conflict to estimate the admissibility factor of an arbitrary belief given the
evidence (i.e. the observables) induced by the channel.
The vulnerability of A given o is then the real probability that the ad-
versary’s choice (viz. a value a0 2  o = argmaxa2A p (a | o) is the correct
one, that is the objective conditional probability p(a0 | o). Again, as there
might be many values of A with the maximal conditional probability, the
attacker will pick uniformly at random one element in  o. Hence we have
the following definition.
Definition 5. The belief-vulnerability of A given O is defined as
V (A |O) =
X
o2O
p(o)V (A | o), where V (A | o) = 1| 0|
X
a2 o
p(a | o).
Next, we show how to compute V (A |O) from the channel matrix p(o | a)
5Also considered in [21].
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and the actual a priori probability p(a).
V (A |O) =
X
o2O
p(o)V (A | o)
=
X
o2O
p(o)
⇣ 1
| o|
X
a2 o
p(a | o)
⌘
=
X
o2O
1
| o|
X
a2 o
p(a | o)p(o).
By Bayes theorem, we have V (A |O) =
P
o2O
1
| o|
P
a2 o p(o | a)p(a). There-
fore, the a posteriori belief-vulnerability can be easily computed as follows.
Proposition 5. Let  o = argmaxa2A p (a | o) then
V (A |O) =
X
o2O
1
| o|
X
a2 o
p(o | a)p(a).
We then define the remaining uncertainty as the belief min-entropy of
A |O.
Definition 6. Let A be a high level input of a channel and O its low output.
The remaining threat to A after observing O, denoted H 1(A |O), is defined
as
H 1(A |O) = log
⇣ 1
V (A |O)
⌘
.
Example 4. Again suppose that A is uniformly distributed over {0, 1, 2, 3}
and the adversary’s initial belief is about the parity of A. Table 4 summarizes
the remaining uncertainty about A after observing O, the output of the
program PROG C5 (see Table 3). Here, the actual a priori distributions are
p1 and p2 as defined in Example 3. The prebeliefs p 01 and p 02 are slight
modifications of p 1 and p 2 of Example 3 to cope with the admissibility
requirement. For instance, consider the 0.04-admissible belief p 01. Then the
adversary’s a posteriori belief is as follows:
p 01(a | o) a0 a1 a2 a3
o0 0.9702 0.02 0.0098 0
o1 0.3289 0 0 0.6711
o2 0 0 1 0
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(p1, p 01) (p1, p 02) (p2, p 01) (p2, p 02)
V (A |O) 0.9802 0.5051 0.5296 0.9699
H 1(A |O) 0.03 0.99 0.92 0.04
p1 p2 p 01 p 02
a0 0.49 0.03 0.49 0.01
a1 0.01 0.47 0.01 0.97
a2 0.49 0.01 0.49 0.01
a3 0.01 0.49 0.01 0.01
Table 4: Remaining uncertainty of program PROG C5
Hence,  o0 = {a0},  o1 = {a3} and  o2 = {a2}. Therefore,
V (A |O) =
X
o2O
1
| o|
X
a2 o
p(o | a)p(a)
=
X
j2{0,1,2}
1
| oj |
X
a2 oj
p(oj | a)p(a)
= p(o0 | a0)p(a0) + p(o1 | a3)p(a3) + p(o2 | a2)p(a2)
= 0.99⇥ p(a0) + 1⇥ p(a3) + 0.99⇥ p(a2)
= 0.99⇥
⇣
p(a0) + p(a2)
⌘
+ p(a3).
In other words, if the actual a priori distribution does not support a1
highly then program PROG C5 will leave A highly vulnerable. This is the
case for both p1 and p2 even though p2 is highly conflicting with p 01. The
reason is that the a posteriori belief p 01(a | o) never supports a1. So putting
almost all the mass on a1 will always fool the attacker. Similarly, for p 02,
we obtain
V (A | O) = p(a1) + 0.99⇥ p(a2) + p(a3).
In order to minimize the a posteriori belief-vulnerability of A, the actual a
priori distribution p must put almost all the mass on a0. Again, this is not
the case for both p1 and p2 which explains why V (A |O) is always greater
that 12 .
Now we establish both lower and upper bounds for the remaining uncer-
tainty in the presence of beliefs. We start with the lower bound and show
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that, as in the case of the initial uncertainty, it is obtained with a full knowl-
edge of the actual a priori distribution (viz., a true and justifiable belief).
Theorem 3. H1(A |O)  H 1(A |O).
Proof. Let  o = argmaxa2A p (a | o).
V (A |O) =
X
o2O
p(o)V (A | o)
=
X
o2O
p(o)
⇣ 1
| o|
X
a2 o
p(a | o)
⌘

X
o2O
p(o)
⇣ 1
| o|
X
a2 o
max
a02A
p(a0 | o)
⌘
(since  o ✓ A)

X
o2O
p(o)
⇣ 1
| o|
X
a2 o
V (A | o)
⌘

X
o2O
p(o)
⇣ | o|
| o| V (A | o)
⌘
 V (A |O).
Hence, H1(A |O)  H 1(A |O).
Again, the lower bound is reached if and only if all the adversary’s possible
choices have the actual maximal a posteriori probability.
Proposition 6. H 1(A |O) = H1(A |O) i↵ 8o 2 O,  o ✓ argmaxa2A p(a | o).
Proof. The proof in the right direction is similar to the proof of Theorem 3
where the inequality is replaced by the equality since  o ✓ argmaxa2A p(a | o).
To see why the opposite holds, it is su cient observe that when there exists
an element of  o that has not the maximal a posteriori probability then
V (A | o)  V (A | o). Hence the uncertainty is greater than the lower-bound.
In particular when the initial belief coincides with the actual a priori
distribution then the belief-vulnerability remaining uncertainty reduces to
the vulnerability remaining uncertainty.
Corollary 2. If p(a) = p (a) for all a in A, then H 1(A |O) = H1(A |O).
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Now, onto the upper-bound.
Theorem 4. Let A be a high input of a channel and O its low output. Then
H 1(A |O)  log
⇣1
⇣
⌘
, where ⇣ = min
o2O
  1
| o|
X
a2 o
p(a | o)  .
Note that ⇣ in the above theorem is strictly greater than zero since we
consider admissible beliefs for some positive ✏. Hence the upper bound is well
defined. yet, ⇣ could be very small, meaning that the presence of belief could
add a huge amount of uncertainty and hence reduce a lot the vulnerability
of A.
Proof. Let  o = argmaxa2A p (a | o).
V (A |O) =
X
o2O
p(o)V (A | o)
=
X
o2O
p(o)
⇣ 1
| o|
X
a2 o
p(a | o)
⌘
 
X
o2O
p(o)min
o2O
⇣ 1
| o|
X
a2 o
p(a | o)
⌘
 
X
o2O
p(o)⇣ = ⇣.
Hence, H 1(A |O)  log
⇣
1
⇣
⌘
.
5. Belief-leakage
As usual, we define the information leakage of a channel as the reduction
of uncertainty.
Definition 7. Let A be a high input of a channel C and O its low output.
Given p, the actual prior distribution of A and p  the belief of the adversary
about A, the information leakage of C is
IL (p, C : p ) = H
 
1(A) H 1(A |O).
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(p1, p 01) (p1, p 02) (p2, p 01) (p2, p 02)
IL (C5) 1 5.65 4.72 1.05
Table 5: Information leakage of program PROG C5
Example 5. Let’s consider again the parameters in Example 4. Since p 01
(resp. p 02), the slight modification of p 1 (resp. p 2), does not a↵ect the
adversary’s choice, it induces the same initial uncertainty as in Example 3.
From Tables 2 and 4 we obtain the information leakage of the program PROG
C5 as in Table 5.
We remark that when the initial belief and the actual a priori distribution
are not highly conflicting (viz. (p1, p 01) and (p2, p 02)) the leakage is about 1
bit of information. Moreover, the leakage is almost equal to the actual leakage
of the program. However, even though the leakage is high (more than 4 bits
of information), when they are highly conflicting, the actual leakage cannot
exceed two bits of information. Hence much of the leakage is due to the
correction of the misinformation induced by the wrong belief.
We note that while the remaining uncertaintyH 1(A |O) is a good charac-
terization of the vulnerability of A after observing O, the information leakage
alone, as usual, does not tell us much about the security of A. Moreover it
might correct a lot the misinformation induced by a wrong belief about A. It
is therefore important to characterize the the amount of uncertainty induced
by a wrong belief.
5.1. Accuracy
From Theorems 1 and 3 we learned that wrong beliefs increase uncer-
tainty. We introduce here a metric for the accuracy of a belief which quanti-
fies the amount of uncertainty induced by the belief inaccuracy. Intuitively,
the more the belief is inaccurate, the more the adversary’s uncertainty should
increase. We therefore quantify the inaccuracy of a belief by the divergence
between the vulnerability induced by the belief and the actual vulnerability.
Definition 8. The belief divergence of p  and p (aka the inaccuracy of p 
w.r.t. p) is D (p k p ) =  log
⇣
V (A)
V (A)
⌘
.
D (p k p ) is always positive or null and accounts for the amount of in-
crease in initial uncertainty due to the inaccuracy of p .
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Lemma 1. D (p k p )   0
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 1.
Proposition 7. H 1(A) = H1(A) +D (p k p )
Proof. Follows directly from their respective definitions (4 and 8).
Similarly we define the posterior inaccuracy as the divergence between
the corresponding posterior vulnerabilities.
Definition 9. The posterior inaccuracy of p  w.r.t. p is D (p k p  : C) =
 log
⇣
V (A |O)
V (A |O)
⌘
.
Again, it is always positive or null (cf. Theorem 3) and accounts for the
amount of increase in the remaining uncertainty due to the inaccuracy of p .
Lemma 2. D (p k p  : C)   0
Proposition 8. H 1(A |O) = H1(A |O) +D (p k p  : C)
5.2. Leakage
In the previous section we have seen that a wrong belief increases the
prior and the posterior min-entropy by the terms D (p k p ) and D (p k p  :
C), respectively. Note that D (p k p ) and D (p k p  : C) can be arbitrary
high. But: how do belief leakage and min-entropy leakage compare? We
would expect the min-entropy leakage never to exceed the belief leakage,
since the channel may correct the initial wrong belief and hence leaks more
information. Actually this is not always the case. Indeed, as shown by our
analysis of program PROG C2 (see Example 1) in Section 6, the belief leakage
can be less, equal or greater than the min-entropy leakage. The reason is
that the channel is not always reducing the inaccuracy of the belief. In fact a
channel may increase the adversary’s confidence over some hypotheses which
are actually very misleading. Thus the change in inaccuracy can be positive,
null or even negative.
From Propositions 7 and 8 we have that a wrong belief increases (resp.
decreases) the leakage by a term  D (p k p  : C) = D (p k p ) D (p k p  :
C) equal to the decrease (resp. increase) in inaccuracy. Hence, the belief
leakage IL (p, C : p ) is related to the min-leakage IL1(p, C) as follows.
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Proposition 9. IL (p, C : p ) = IL1(p, C) + D (p k p  : C)
Interestingly, as in the case of the min-entropy leakage and the g-leakage,
the belief leakage is also null when the low output and the high input are
independent.
Theorem 5 (Zero-leakage). H 1(A)  H 1(A |O) = 0 if A and O are inde-
pendent.
Proof. Assume that A and O are independent. Then from Equation 9 we
have that for all observable o, the posterior belief p (a | o) is equal to the
prior belief p (a). Hence,  o =   for all observable o. In other words, the
observables do not a↵ect the adversary’s choice. Therefore,
V (A |O) =
X
o2O
p(o)V (A | o) =
X
o2O
p(o)
⇣ 1
| o|
X
a2 o
p(a | o)
⌘
=
X
o2O
p(o)
⇣ 1
| |
X
a2 
p(a | o)
⌘
( Independence of A and O)
=
X
o2O
p(o)
⇣ 1
| |
X
a2 
p(a)
⌘
=
X
o2O
p(o)V (A) = V (A).
Hence H 1(A |O) = H 1(A).
Finally, we may wonder whether the belief leakage of a channel C can
ever be negative, as C may increase the inaccuracy of a belief. However,
as in the case of the min-entropy leakage and the g-leakage [25], the belief
leakage is always positive or null as it is defined in terms of expectation.
Theorem 6. H 1(A) H 1(A |O)   0.
6. On the Applicability of the Belief-vulnerability Approach
The previous section establishes our definitions in terms of their theo-
retical properties. Now we show the utility of our approach by applying it
to various threat scenarios and comparing the results to the previous ap-
proaches. This is done through an extensive analysis of the deterministic
program PROG C1 and the probabilistic program PROG C2 of Example 1. In
order to simplify the reading, we reproduce them here.
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PROG C2:
BEGIN
R ‘sampled from {0, 2} with p(0) =   and p(2) = 1   ’;
If A = R
Then O := A
Else O :=  1
END
PROG C1:
BEGIN
O := b log(A + 2) c
END
Each of these programs is analysed under the following hypothesis.
• The actual prior distribution of the high input A is such that
p(a0) = p(a2) =
!
2(1 + !)
and p(a1) = p(a3) =
1
2(1 + !)
,
for some 0 < !  1.
• The adversary believes that A is most likely an even number, that is
she assumes the following 12 -admissible belief:
p (a0) = p (a2) =
3
8
and p (a1) = p (a3) =
1
8
.
Thus   = {a0, a2} and hence the probability that a guess of the attacker
is correct is reduced by the factor ! compared to someone who knows
the actual distribution.
We denote by IUx the initial uncertainty computed using the approach
x 2 {s,1,  } where s, 1 and   denote the Shannon entropy, Re´nyi min-
entropy and belief-based approaches respectively. Ditto for RUx and ILx.
We start with PROG C1.
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6.1. Analysis of PROG C1
Shannon entropy leakage. For the prior entropy we have:
IUs = H(A) =  
X
a2A
p(a) log p(a)
=  
⇣ !
2(1 + !)
log
!
2(1 + !)
+
1
2(1 + !)
log
1
2(1 + !)
+
!
2(1 + !)
log
!
2(1 + !)
+
1
2(1 + !)
log
1
2(1 + !)
⌘
=  
⇣ !
1 + !
log
!
2(1 + !)
+
1
1 + !
log
1
2(1 + !)
⌘
= 1 + log(1 + !)  !
1 + !
log!.
For the posterior entropy, we have p(o0) = p(o1) =
1
2 since we have p(o) =P
a2A p(o | a)p(a). The conditional probabilities p(a | o) = p(o | a)p(a)p(o) are
given in Table 6. Thus,
RUs = H(A | O) =  
X
o2O
p(o)
X
a2A
p(a | o) log p(a | o)
=  
h1
2
⇣ !
1 + !
log
!
1 + !
+
1
1 + !
log
1
1 + !
⌘
+
1
2
⇣ !
1 + !
log
!
1 + !
+
1
1 + !
log
1
1 + !
⌘i
=  
⇣ !
1 + !
log
!
1 + !
+
1
1 + !
log
1
1 + !
⌘
= log(1 + !)  !
1 + !
log!.
Hence the leakage is ILs = IUs  RUs = 1. It is illustrated in Figure 1.
Min-entropy leakage. For the prior min-entropy, we have
IU1 = H1(A) =   log V (A) =   log(max
a2A
p(a)) =   log 1
2(1 + !)
= 1 + log(1 + !).
Similarly, for the posterior min-entropy, we have
RU1 = H1(A | O) =   log V (A | O) =   log
⇣X
o2O
p(o)max
a2A
p(a | o)
⌘
=   log(1
2
· 1
1 + !
+
1
2
· 1
1 + !
) = log(1 + !).
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p(o | a) 00 01
a0 1 0
a1 1 0
a2 0 1
a3 0 1
p(a | o) a0 a1 a2 a3
o0
!
1+!
1
1+! 0 0
o1 0 0
!
1+!
1
1+!
p (a | o) a0 a1 a2 a3
o0
3
4
1
4 0 0
o1 0 0
3
4
1
4
x IUx RUx ILx(C1)
s 1 + log(! + 1)  !!+1 log! log(! + 1)  !!+1 log! 1
1 1 + log(! + 1) log(! + 1) 1
  1 + log(! + 1)  log! log(! + 1)  log! 1
Table 6: Matrices of conditional probabilities and the leakages of PROG C1
Again, the leakage is 1 since IL1 = IU1   RU1 = 1. It is illustrated in
Figure 1.
Belief leakage. Since the adversary initially believes that A is most likely
even, then   = {a0, a2}. Hence the belief vulnerability of A is
V (A) =
1
 
X
a2 
p(a) =
1
2
X
a2{a0,a2}
p(a)) =
!
2(1 + !)
.
Thus IU  = H 1(A) =   log V (A) = 1 + log(1 + !)  log(!).
For the posterior belief vulnerability, from Bayes’ rule, we obtain the ad-
versary’s updated belief p (a | o) as in Table 6, whence we obtain the following
sets of adversary’s possible choices  o0 = {a0} and  o1 = {a2}. Therefore,
V (A |O) =
X
o2O
1
| o|
X
a2 o
p(o | a)p(a) =
X
j2{0,1}
1
| oj |
X
a2 oj
p(oj | a)p(a)
= p(o0 | a0)p(a0) + p(o1 | a2)p(a2) = !
1 + !
.
Hence RU  = H 1(A |O) =   log V (A |O) = log(1 + !)   log(!), which
results in a leakage of 1 again. Thus, the fact that the adversary initially
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Figure 1: Shannon leakage of
C1
Figure 2: Min-leakage of C1 Figure 3: Belief leakage of C1
believes that A is even does not a↵ect the quantity of information leaked by
PROG C1. However, the real question is not how much information is leaked
by this program, but what the remaining uncertainty represents in terms of
security threat to the high input. Even though the adversary’s belief does not
a↵ect the quantity of the information leakage, it dramatically a↵ects both
the initial and remaining uncertainty. Indeed, as illustrated by Figure 3,
both IU  and RU  tend toward infinity as ! tends toward zero. On the
other hand, IU  and RU  tend toward two and one, respectively, as ! tends
toward one. In other words inaccurate beliefs strengthen the security of the
program (by confusing the adversary). Thus, a deliberate leakage of a wrong
side information biased toward the less likely parity of the high input is a
good strategy to strengthen the security of this program.
6.2. Analysis of PROG C2
We continue our analysis with the probabilistic program PROG C2. The
initial uncertainty remains the same as in the analysis of the program PROG
C1. Following the same approach as for PROG C1, we obtain the matrices of
conditional probabilities and the leakages for PROG C2 shown in Table 7.
Proposition 10 (Shannon entropy leakage of PROG C2).
ILs(C1) = 1 + log(! + 1)  !
2(! + 1)
log!   ! + 2
2(! + 1)
log(! + 2)
+
!
2(! + 1)
⇣
  log  + (1   ) log(1   )
⌘
.
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p(o | a) 00 01 02
a0 1      0
a1 1 0 0
a2   0 1   
a3 1 0 0
p(a | o) a0 a1 a2 a3
o0
(1  )!
2+!
1
2+!
 !
2+!
1
2+!
o1 1 0 0 0
o2 0 0 1 0
p (a | o) a0 a1 a2 a3
o0
3
5 (1   ) 15 35  15
o1 1 0 0 0
o2 0 0 1 0
x RUx ILx(C2)
s !+22(!+1) log(! + 2)  !2(!+1)
⇣
log! +   log  + (1   ) log(1   )
⌘
see Propostion 10
1 1 log(! + 1)
  1 + log(! + 1)  log!   log(1 + max( , 1   )) log(1 + max( , 1   ))
Table 7: Matrices of conditional probabilities and the leakages of PROG C2
The information flow ascribed by the Shannon entropy is illustrated in
Figures 4 and 5, those of the belief-based approach in Figures 6 and 7. We
note that the randomisation parameter   of PROG C2 has no e↵ect on the min-
entropy leakage. This is due to the fact that this metric focuses on the single
probability that poses the greatest risk; the actual posterior probabilities of
a1 and a3, the possible choices of the adversary, do not depend on  . On the
other hand, the accuracy factor ! of the adversary’s prior belief has no e↵ect
on the belief leakage. This is due to the fact that she always chooses the even
number a0 or a2 towards which   is biased independently of !. Since a0 and
a2 play symmetric roles with respect to  , any gain in uncertainty due to the
value towards which   is biased is o↵set by the loss due to the other value.
Finally, comparing the min-entropy leakage and the belief leakage of PROG
C2 (see Figure 8), we can assert that belief leakage is higher than min-entropy
leakage except for highly accurate beliefs. In fact, we have the following result
relating min-entropy and belief leakages depending on the randomisation
parameter   and !, the accuracy factor of the adversary’s prior belief.
Proposition 11. The belief leakage of PROG C2 is higher than its min-
entropy leakage if and only if the randomisation parameter   and !, the
accuracy factor of the adversary’s prior belief, satisfy the following relation:
!  max( , 1   ).
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Figure 4: RUs of PROG C2 Figure 5: ILs of PROG C2
Figure 6: RU  of PROG C2 Figure 7: IL  of PROG C2
6.3. Belief accuracy vs adversary’s confidence
Our analysis so far confirmed that inaccurate beliefs tend to confuse the
adversary by reducing the probability that she correctly guesses the hidden
or protected data. However, it might be the case that the interaction with
the security mechanism (wrongly) increased the adversary’s confidence about
the value of the hidden or protected data, that is, she wrongly believes that
she has learned some useful information. Hence, she may end up being highly
confident about her (wrong) result and may take action that results in serious
harm to an innocent victim or to the whole society.
For instance, assume that A is the set of hidden identities of the users of
the security system. Consider a ‘dictator’ adversary who takes action against
a user a only when she believes that a is more likely to be the culprit (i.e.
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Figure 8: Belief leakage vs min-entropy leakage (PROG C2)
more likely to be the hidden input) than to not be the culprit. In other words,
she only takes action against a when p (a) >
1
2 a priori or p (a | o) > 12 a
posteriori for a given observable o.
Now let us see how our simple programs C1 and C2 perform against such
adversary. First, we note that, a priori, there is no victim since the adver-
sary’s prior belief p  does not assign a mass strictly higher than one-half to
any value of A. However, after observing the outcome of C1 (see Table 6)
we have that p˜ (a0 | o0) = p˜ (a2 | o1) = 34 . Therefore, the adversary will
take action against a0 (resp. a2) when she observes o0 (resp. o1) even though
a0 (resp. a2) is highly unlikely to be the input when !, the accuracy factor
of the adversary’s prior belief, is very small. Let Prob[Vic : p , p, C] (resp.
Prob[Inn : p , p, C]) denote the probability that the adversary takes action
against a user (resp. an innocent user) after observing the outcome of the
channel C when her prior belief is p  and the actual prior probability is p.
Let p  and p be as in the previous section. Then the followings hold.
Proposition 12. Programs C1 and C2 perform against a dictator adversary
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as follows.
Prob[Vic : p , p, C1] = 1
Prob[Inn : p , p, C1] =
1
1 + !
Prob[Vic : p , p, C2] =
⇢ !
2(1+!) if
1
6     56
1 otherwise
Prob[Inn : p , p, C2] =
(
0 if 16     56
2+!⇥min( ,1  )
2(1+!) otherwise
Proof. The probability of having a victim can be expressed as the sum of the
probability Prob[p (a | o) > 12 ] that user a is a victim given the observable o
weighted by the actual probability p(o) of the observable. Hence
Prob[Vic : p , p, C] =
X
o2O
X
a2A
p(o)⇥ Prob[p (a | o) > 1
2
].
Similarly, the probability of having an innocent victim can be expressed as
the sum of the probability of having a victim a for each observable o weighted
by the actual probability
P
a0 6=a p(a
0 | o) that somebody else could have been
the actual input. Thus
Prob[Vic : p , p, C] =
X
o2O
X
a2A
p(o)⇥ Prob[p (a | o) > 1
2
]
⇣X
a0 6=a
p(a0 | o)
⌘
.
Since p(o) =
P
a2A p(o | a)p(a), the proposition follows from Table 6 and
Table 7.
The results above show that in terms of protecting everybody (i.e. not
having victims), C1 ensures zero level of protection, since whatever the out-
come of the program is the adversary will become confident enough about her
guess to take action. Ditto for C2 when the randomization factor   is highly
biased towards one value of A. However, when   is not highly biased, then
C2 becomes extremely good, since the most likely outcome o0 does not in-
crease the adversary’s confidence enough to trigger an action, specially when
!, the accuracy factor of her prior belief, is very small. Hence in terms of
protecting everybody against such ‘dictator’ adversary, C2 performs better
than C1 when   is not highly biased. But they are equally bad when   is
highly biased.
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In terms of protecting only the innocent victims, C2 is perfect when  
is not highly biased, since in this case the adversary will never take action
against an innocent victim. However when   is highly biased, C2 becomes
slightly worse that C1. The reason is that in this case even when the input
is an even number there is a small probability that the adversary’s guess is
wrong for C2 when she observes o0. This is never the case for C1.
The elementary examples in this paper illustrate the applicability of our
metric to various threat scenarios. In particular, they show that confidence,
i.e., the entropy of the adversary’s belief, and accuracy are two orthogonal
dimensions of security. We need to consider both of them in order to be able
to model a wide range of threat scenarios. Typically, the adversary makes
her decision according to her confidence in her beliefs, i.e., based on the
uncertainty metric. On the other hand, the consequence of her decision, viz.,
the gain, usually depends on the accuracy metric. The ‘dictator’ example
illustrates the limit case where the gain is independent of the accuracy (as
the dictator always wins). It also shows the importance of the reliability of
side information.
7. Related work
We have already mentioned in Sections 1 and 3 much of the related work.
In this section we only discuss the work that is closely related to our frame-
work and that was not already reported there.
As far as we know, [21, 22] have been the first papers to address the
adversary’s beliefs in quantifying information flow. This line of work, which
inspired our formulation of the belief-vulnerability, is based on the Kullback-
Leibler distance, a concept related to Shannon entropy which in general, as
already mentioned in Section 3, fails to characterize many realistic attacks
scenarios. Belief semantics has been explored also in the context of other
security properties in [39, 40]. In a recent paper [41], Hussein proposed a
generalization of the Bayesian-based framework of [22] based on Dempster-
Shafer theory. The accuracy is expressed in terms of the generalized Jensen-
Shannon divergence [42] between the belief and the actual value of the high
input. Our metric is, on the contrary, based on the min-entropy leakage,
where a leakage of k-bits means that on average the channel increases the
vulnerability of the secret to being guessed correctly in one single try by the
factor 2k. Moreover, as shown by recent work [25], quantitative information
flow metrics based on the min-entropy model can be extended by so-called
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gain functions to account for a wider range of operational attack scenarios.
While the framework in [25] is closely related to ours, as they both generalize
the quantitative information flow model based on Re´nyi min-entropy, their
objectives are orthogonal. Belief functions model the adversary’s (potentially
incorrect) side information; gain-functions model the operational threat sce-
narios, such as the adversary’s benefit from guessing a value ‘close’ to the
actual value of the secret, guessing a property of the secret, or guessing its
value within some number of tries.
A related line of research has explored methods of statistical inference, in
particular those from the hypothesis testing framework. The idea is that the
adversary’s best guess is that the true input is the one which has the maxi-
mum conditional probability (MAP rule) and that, therefore, the a posteriori
vulnerability of the system is the complement of the Bayes Risk, which is the
average probability of making the wrong guess when using the MAP rule
[43]. This is always at least as high as the a priori vulnerability, which is
the probability of making the right guess just based on the knowledge of the
input distribution. It turns out that Smith’s notion of leakage actually cor-
responds to the ratio between the a posteriori and the a priori vulnerabilities
[24, 44].
Concerning the computation of the channel matrix and of the leakage for
probabilistic systems, one of the first works to attack the problem was [45],
in which the authors proposed various model-checking techniques. One of
these is able to generate counterexamples, namely points in the execution
where the channel exhibits an excessive amount of leakage. This method
is therefore also useful to fix unsound protocols. A subsequent paper [46]
focussed more on the e ciency and proposed the use of binary decision di-
agrams and symbolic model checking. For systems that are too large to
apply model-checking, approximate techniques based on statistics have been
proposed [47].
8. Conclusion and future work
This paper presents a new approach to quantitative information flow that
incorporates the attacker’s beliefs in the model on Re´nyi min entropy. We
investigate the impact of such adversary’s inaccurate, misleading or outdated
side information on the security of the secret information. Our analysis
reveals that inaccurate side information tends to confuse the adversary by
decreasing the probability of a correct guess. However, due to the inaccuracy
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of her side information, the interaction with the security mechanism may
(wrongly) strengthen the adversary’s confidence about her choice. While the
attacker might not actually discover the true value of the secret, the fact that
she wrongly believes to actually know it constitutes a security threat, since
it can adversely influence how she views or interacts with the victim. We
have shown the strength of our definitions both in terms of their theoretical
properties and of their utility by applying them to various threat scenarios.
As already stated in [21, 22], our results confirm, in particular, that the
confidence of the attacker and the accuracy of her belief are two orthogonal
dimensions of the security. Depending on the threat operational scenario,
both could be equally important or one more relevant than the other. We
observe that our approach can also be seen as moving away from the often
criticised yet standard assumption in information flow that the adversary
knows the true distribution of secrets. More realistically, here the focus is on
the attacker’s assumptions about such distributions (their a priori beliefs),
and the consequences of making them.
As future work, we shall extend our model to consider a wide range of
operational threat scenarios especially in the presence of wrong beliefs. To
achieve this goal, we plan to build upon our belief framework and the gain-
functions framework [25]. Secondly, we shall devise methods and techniques
of collecting and aggregating the adversary’s side information from di↵erent
and potentially conflicting sources such as social networks, online forums
and blogs, etc. We believe that the body of concepts and results related
to the notion of belief combination will provide natural and solid tools for
this goal. Finally, we also plan to implement our framework in a tool to
assess the e↵ectiveness of current security/privacy mechanisms in a real-
world context and under various attack scenarios. Doing so, will help us to
have a clear view of the real impact of side information collected from social
networks, online forums, blogs and other forms of online communication and
information sharing. It will also help us to accurately estimate the reliability
of each of these sources, as well as providing guidelines and some mechanism
design principles for privacy-preserving and security mechanisms.
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Appendix A. Some notions of the Dempster-Shafer Theory
In this paper, we have considered the case where the adversary is com-
bining information from an external ( and potentially unreliable) source and
the observables of the program/protocol in order to increase her chance of
breaking the system. Many fusion theories such as possibility theory [48],
probability theory [12], and Dempster-Shafer theory [30, 31] have been pro-
posed for the combination of information from di↵erent sources. Both pos-
sibility and probability theories can model imprecise and uncertain data at
the same time. But the Dempster-Shafer theory is more adapted because
it generalizes the others and, in particular, it has higher ability to combine
information from (partially or totally) disagreeing sources.
Appendix A.1. Belief functions
Let X be a frame of discernment, that is, a finite set of exhaustive and
mutually exclusive hypotheses6.
Definition 10 (Basic belief assignment (bba)). A basic belief assign-
ment (aka belief mass function) is a mapping m : 2X  ! [0, 1] that satisfies:
(1) : m(;) = 0;
(2) :
P
⇥✓X m(⇥) = 1.
6Non-exhaustive and infinite frames of discernment are not considered.
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The mass m(⇥) expresses our confidence or belief that the actual state of
the world belongs to the subset ⇥. It represents only the proportion of all
relevant and available evidence supporting ⇥ and makes no additional claims
about any subset of ⇥. Note that the condition m(;) = 0 specifies the closed-
world assumption, that is, the exhaustiveness of the hypotheses in the frame
of discernment.
The focal elements of a bbam are the subsets ⇥ of X such thatm(⇥) > 0.
The set of the focal elements constitutes the core of the bba. A categorical
belief is a bba m focusing on a single element, that is, there exists a subset ⇥
such that m(⇥) = 1. A categorical belief focusing on the entire world X is
called a vacuous belief and expresses a total ignorance about the actual state
of the world. A bba focusing on singletons of X is a Bayesian belief. Finally,
the set {(⇥,m(⇥) |⇥ 2 2X and m(⇥) > 0} of focal elements together with
their mass is called a body of evidence (BOE). By abuse of language we shall
identify a BOE by its corresponding bba. We also write m(x) for m({x}).
Since our attacker may have collected her side information from many
(potentially conflicting) sources, she needs to find a way of combining the dif-
ferent BOEs provided by her sources. Moreover, since some of these sources
might be unreliable, she also needs a sound technique to discount beliefs
from unreliable sources. Finally, since our adversary is a decision maker as
she needs to make one single guess based on her belief, see needs a way of
deriving a subjective probability distribution from her belief mass function.
The following sections present such techniques.
Appendix A.2. Combination of information
Given two bodies of evidence m1 and m2, the more classical way of com-
bining them is Dempster’s rule of combination (DRC) defined as
m1  m2(⇥) =
8><>:
0 if ⇥ = ;
P
⌦1\⌦2=⇥m1(⌦1)m2(⌦2)
1 P⌦1\⌦2=;m1(⌦1)m2(⌦2) otherwise.
(A.1)
DRC is not the only rule to combine two bbas. Indeed, there is a ’jungle’
of combination rules developed in the literature essentially to answer the
following Zadeh’s [49] famous counterexample. Consider X = {x0, x1, x2}
and two expert opinions given by m1(x0) = 0.9, m1(x2) = 0.1, and m2(x1) =
0.9, m2(x2) = 0.1. The DRC gives m1   m2(x2) = 1. Hence, since the
two experts are highly conflicting in the hypothesis they strongly support,
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the alternative x2, hardly supported by each of them, turn out to be fully
supported after the combination.
Several alternatives solutions have been proposed that all reject the m1 
m2(x2) = 1 solution (e.g [50, 51, 52]). None has reached a universal accep-
tance and interestingly DRC remains the most widely accepted and used in
many application. The main concern with all these rules is that they are all
based on the assumption that the sources of information are fully reliable.
A strong assumption hardly supported for real life applications. Indeed, in
intelligence gathering as well as in many real world information fusion sys-
tems, one must rate separately the quality (reliability, trustworthiness) of
both the source and the content of the report. If the source is judged unreli-
able then the contain must by discarded. Therefore, one must first determine
the reliability of the sources of the bbas before combining them.
Appendix A.3. Belief reliability
If one assumes that the source of his belief is fully reliable then he must
accept it as it is. On the contrary, if the source is unreliable, then the belief
must be discarded. An intermediate case is where we accept that the source
might be more or less unreliable. Thus, we are building a bba m⇢ over the
space R = {r, nr} representing our beliefs about the fact that the source of
our bba m is reliable (r) or not reliable (nr). Let ↵ = m⇢(r) be our belief
about the fact that the source is reliable. If ↵ = 1 then we would accept
m. If ↵ = 0 then we would discard m and our belief would become vacuous.
More generally, said ↵ is the confidence level on the reliability of the source
of the bba m about ⇥, the application of the General Bayesian Theorem [53]
produces our discounted [31] belief about ⇥,
m↵(⇥) =
8<: ↵m(⇥) if ⇥ 6= X
↵m(X ) + (1  ↵) otherwise.
(A.2)
Every mass in m is shrunk by a factor ↵ and the mass lost is transferred
to the universe (i.e. the frame of discernment). The factor ↵ is called the
coe cient of the reliability and   = 1  ↵ is the discount rate.
It is easy to see that discounting a discounted bba7 is equivalent to dis-
counting the bba by the product of the coe cients of the reliability.
7When for instance the evaluator of source of a bba need to be rated himself.
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Lemma 3. m↵
↵0
(⇥) = m↵↵
0
(⇥).
Appendix A.4. Pignistic transformation
The mass m(⇥) expresses our confidence that the actual state of the
world belongs to the subset ⇥ and makes no additional claims about any
subset of ⇥. However, it is usually necessary to use the beliefs to make a
decision, like the single-try attack scenario considered in this paper. In this
case, a rational decision-maker should approximate the bba by a subjective
probability measure, known as pignistic probability measure, based on the
underlying frame of discernment. Many pignistic transformations (aka pig-
nistic probabilizations) have been proposed (e.g [54]). Here, we only consider
the well-known and widely used transformation defined as [55]
pm(x) =
X
⇥✓X s.t. x2⇥
1
|⇥|m(⇥) for all x in X , (A.3)
where |⇥| is the cardinality of the set ⇥.
The next lemma shows that the transformation of a categorical belief re-
distributes uniformly the mass of its unique focal element ⇥ to the singletons
of ⇥. In particular, when m is vacuous, its transformation is the uniform
probability distribution over the frame of discernment X . The transforma-
tion of a Bayesian belief m is equal to m. Finally, the discounted mass of
a belief is uniformly redistributed to the singletons of the frame after the
transformation.
Lemma 4. 1. If m is categorical focusing on ⇥, then
pm(x) =
8><>:
1
|⇥| if x 2 ⇥
0 otherwise.
2. If m is vacuous then pm(x) =
1
|X | for all x in X .
3. if m is a Bayesian belief then pm(x) = m(x) for all x in X .
4. pm↵(x) = ↵ pm(x) +
1  ↵
|X | .
In summary, the adversary constructs her belief as follow: she collects in-
formation from di↵erent sources represented by the BOEs, she discounts each
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BOE according to the reliability of its source, she combines the discounted
BOEs using the Dempster’s rule of combination, then she finally derives
the subjective probability distribution thanks to the pignistic transforma-
tion above. This subjective probability distribution models the adversary’s
belief in our framework.
Appendix B. Reliability and discounting
In Section 4.2, our belief updating based on the Bayes’ rule requires the
admissibility restriction. We introduce here a new approach which allow us
to estimate the admissibility factor ✏ of an arbitrary belief given the chan-
nel matrix. More precisely, given an arbitrary belief p , we will compute its
reliability factor ↵ w.r.t. the evidence induced by the channel (viz its ob-
servables). The discounted belief p↵  is ✏-admissible, with ✏ = (1 ↵). Indeed
the following holds.
Proposition 13. Let p  be an arbitrary belief and ↵ be the reliability factor
of its source. Then the discounted belief p↵  is (1  ↵)-admissible.
Proof. From Lemma 4 we have p↵ (a) = ↵p (a) +
1 ↵
|A|   1 ↵|A| . Hence, p↵  is
(1  ↵)-admissible when ↵ 6= 1.
Appendix B.1. Belief reliability
Estimating the reliability of beliefs from di↵erent sources of evidence is
a challenging and very popular topic of research. Indeed, the Theory of Ev-
idence (viz Theory of Belief) is becoming increasingly popular and widely
used for decision making [56, 57] in information fusion. Moreover, in many
real applications, not all the sources of evidence might have the same relia-
bility and there is no prior knowledge about it. Recently, many discounting
frameworks (e.g. [58, 59]), mainly based on two di↵erent approaches, have
been proposed to enhance the trustworthiness of information from unreli-
able sources of evidence. On the one hand, there are methods that propose
distance metrics8 to capture the level (viz the quantity) of the dissimilarity
between di↵erent opinions, but cannot show whether or not they conflict in
the hypothesis they strongly support. On the other hand, most of the metrics
8See [60] for more detail on distances between beliefs.
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proposed in the literature measure the conflict between beliefs. These met-
rics capture well the quality of the dissimilarity of opinions, that is, whether
or not they distribute most of their support to compatible (viz same) ele-
ments. Having noticed that both approaches fail to give satisfactory results
in general and that each of them capture only one of two complementary
aspects of the dissimilarity, [59] propose to combine both approaches.
The distance and conflict metrics of [59] translate in our setting as
Dist(p, q) =
1
2
⇣X
a2A
|p(a)  q(a)|
⌘
and
Conf(p, q) =
⇢
0 if argmaxa2A p(a) \ argmaxa2A q(a) 6= ;
p(a0)q(a00) otherwise,
where a0 2 argmaxa2A p(a) and a00 2 argmaxa2A q(a).
An immediate consequence is that the distance between two beliefs is null
if and only if the two opinions fully agree, i.e. they produces the same belief.
Conversely, the distance is maximum if they fully contradict each other.
Lemma 5. Dist(p, q) = 0 i↵ 8a 2 A, p(a) = q(a).
Lemma 6. Dist(p, q) = 1 i↵ 8a 2 A, p(a) 6= 0) q(a) = 0.
Similarly, the conflict is maximum if and only if they fully support two
distinct elements.
Lemma 7. Conf(p, q) = 1 i↵ 9a0, a00 2 A s.t. p(a0) = q(a00) = 1 and a0 6= a00.
The disagreement between two beliefs is an indicator of the unreliability
of at least one of them. If they totally disagree then at least one of them
is unreliable, while if they totally agree then both are equi-reliable. In this
framework we adopt the following dissimilarity metric as an estimation of
the relative disagreement between two beliefs.
Dissim(p, q) =
Dist(p, q) + Conf(p, q)
1 + Dist(p, q) · Conf(p, q) . (B.1)
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Appendix B.2. Discount rate
In order to determine the coe cient of the reliability of the belief, we
first need to determine the belief induced by an evidence o. For example,
considering the channel PROG C5 (see Table 3), when the adversary sees o2
then the belief mass mo2 induced by her observation is
mo2(⌦) =
⇢
1 if ⌦ = {a2}
0 otherwise.
But if she observes o1 then she knows that the high input is either a0 or
a3 but has no clear reason to prefer one over the other, even though o1 is
unlikely when the high input is a0. In fact, if the actual a priori distribution
of A is such that p(a3) = 0.01, then when we observe o1, the unlikely has
happened either at the random generation of A or in the channel output.
Therefore the only reasonable belief mass induced by o1 is
mo1(⌦) =
⇢
1 if ⌦ = {a0, a3}
0 otherwise.
Thus, the belief mass induced by an observable o is the categorical belief
mass
mo(⌦) =
⇢
1 if ⌦ = {a 2 A | p(o | a) > 0}
0 otherwise.
Now let Ao = {a 2 A | p(o | a) > 0} be the focal set of the belief mass induced
by o. Then by the pignistic probabilization, we obtain the following belief
over A induced by o:
po(a) =
⇢ 1
|Ao| if a 2 Ao
0 otherwise.
(B.2)
The dissimilarity metric defined in Equation B.1 allows us to estimate the
relative disagreement between two beliefs. However in an uncertain environ-
ment where the reliability of the sources of both beliefs is unknown, we have
no clear way to tell which of them is more reliable as the dissimilarity only
measures their relative disagreement. Fortunately, in this paper, the belief
po induced by a channel output is fully reliable. Hence the dissimilarity be-
tween po and p  is a good indicator of the unreliability of the prebelief p .
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Therefore we compute the discount rate of p  induced by o as the relative
dissimilarity between p  and po given by
 o =
Dist(p , po) + Conf(p , po)
1 + Dist(p , po) · Conf(p , po) . (B.3)
It is easy to see that, on the one hand the discount rate is null if and only
if the evidence o fully agrees with the initial belief. On the other hand, the
initial belief is fully discounted if and only if o contradicts it.
Lemma 8. (1)  o = 0 i↵ 8a 2 Ao, p (a) = 1|Ao| and (2)  o = 1 i↵ 8a 2
Ao, p (a) = 0.
Proof. We start with Equivalence (1).
 o = 0 () Dist(p , po) = conf(p , po) = 0 (Lemma 5)
() p  = po (Eq B.2)
() 8a 2 Ao, p (a) = 1|Ao| .
For Equivalence (2):
 o = 1 ()
⇣
Dist(p , po) = 1
⌘
_
⇣
Conf(p , po) = 1
⌘
(Lemmas 6 and 7)
()
⇣
8a 2 A, po(a) 6= 0) p (a) = 0
⌘
_⇣
9a0, a00 2 A s.t. p(a0) = q(a00) = 1 and a0 6= a00
⌘
() 8a 2 Ao, p (a) = 0.
We finally define the discount rate of a belief w.r.t. a channel as the
expectation of the discount rates induced by its observables. Note that our
approach of deriving po as the pignistic probabilization of the categorical
belief mass mo is equivalent to Bayesian update of a vacuous belief (i.e. in
the absence of any information) when observing o. Therefore, we take the
expectation under the uniform distribution pu(a) overA. Hence, the discount
rate of a belief p  w.r.t. a channel p(o | a) is
  =
X
o2O
pu(o) o with pu(o) =
1
|A|
X
a2A
p(o|a). (B.4)
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Next we show that a belief cannot be fully discounted since it cannot
totally conflict with all the observables.
Theorem 7. 0    < 1.
Proof. We start with the proof of 0   .
8o 2 O, 0   o and 0  pu(o) =) 0 
X
o2O
pu(o) o =) 0    (Eq. B.4).
To prove   < 1, we show that   = 1 leads to a contradictory belief.
  = 1 () 8o 2 O,  o = 1
() 8o 2 O,
⇣
Dist(p , po) = 1
⌘
_
⇣
Conf(p , po) = 1
⌘
() 8o 2 O, 8a 2 A,
⇣
po(a) 6= 0) p (a) = 0
⌘
_⇣
9a0, a00 2 A s.t. p(a0) = q(a00) = 1 and a0 6= a00
⌘
(From Lemmas 6 and 7)
() 8o 2 O, 8a 2 Ao, p (a) = 0
() 8a 2 A, p (a) = 0 ( since [o2O Ao = A).
Hence p  would be a contradictory belief, which is not possible under our
closed-world assumption.
From the first point of Lemma 8, from Theorem 7 and Proposition 13,
we know that the discounted belief p(1  )  (a) is never in full contradiction
with the evidence o. We therefore define the posteriori belief as the Bayesian
update of the discounted belief, i.e.
⇠
p  (a | o) =
p(o | a)p↵ (a)P
a02A p(o | a0)p↵ (a0)
, whith ↵ = 1   . (B.5)
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